Three Techniques for Improved Intelligence Support: Continuous Dissemination | Library/ Librarian core domain is providing continuous intelligence support to their user's
John
G. Wildt and David Del Signore
In
the 21st century, America’s adversaries are conducting operations and making
decentralized decisions at increasing velocities. As intelligence
professionals, we must provide timely intelligence support to maneuver
commanders if we are to remain relevant. However, the traditional intelligence
cycle itself has often stood in the way of our success during the last 15 years
of counterinsurgency (COIN) and Gray Zone operations. Specifically, the fact
that dissemination occurs at the end of the intelligence cycle has kept us at
the mercy of the enemy’s decision cycle, which often has fewer constraints and
is faster than ours. In order to fix this deficiency, the authors propose that
“continuous dissemination” is the right mindset for 21st century military operations.
Though nothing proposed in this article should be seen as revolutionary, the
authors recognize that many intelligence professionals may not have had the
advantage of deploying to and working in a high-op-tempo environment.
While
serving as the intelligence staff for a special operations’ task force in
Afghanistan in 2014, our team tested this approach and found the results to be
excellent. We used three methods to ensure that we were synchronized with our
maneuver elements. The first method we used was constant communication with the
special operations teams we supported through the entire operational cycle.
Some of our analysts were collocated with the teams to help plan operations,
while other analysts at our headquarters made sure they disseminated all the
intelligence they could find and develop. The second method we used was
knowledge management. Our routine and predictable file architecture helped our
supported teams find the information they needed, night or day. Finally, we
worked hard to provide the best possible real time intelligence support once
our teams were actively engaged with the enemy. Through trial and error, we
developed what we believe is an excellent template for supporting troops in
contact (TICs) with the enemy. We believe that these three methods together
will provide intelligence professionals with an effective way to support their
maneuver elements.
Constant
Collaboration
Based
on our task force commander’s guidance and vision, special operations teams and
intelligence analysts worked in concert to plan future operations. The
intelligence staff tasked intelligence assets to confirm or deny our basic
assumptions and then worked with the operations staff to create tentative
plans. After that, analysts worked with maneuver units to nominate specific
targets; sometimes the analysts would propose ideas to the teams based on
indicators of enemy activity and other times the teams would propose targets to
the analysts based on their personal knowledge of the area. The result of this
close collaboration between analyst and maneuver commander was a set of targets
that the operations and intelligence personnel both felt comfortable taking
action on.
Once
intelligence analysts and special operations teams produced a series of
targets, they briefed the task force commander to make sure their proposed
targets met his intent. At this point, we continued collection operations to
help build extremely detailed target packets. Our analysts synthesized the
information collected by each discipline and created clear, concise, fused
intelligence products for the special operations teams. Crucially, these
included the special operations teams’ insights about their Area of Operations
(AOs). By synthesizing information we collected through traditional intelligence
collection methods, and considering the special operations teams’ personal
knowledge of their AOs, we produced preliminary target packets that were
thorough and well received by the special operations teams.
Discussion,
research, collection, and analysis ensured the staff and teams had an in-depth
knowledge of each target and its unique features. Though collection continued
up until mission launch, it primarily focused on confirming or denying what we
already knew and ensuring that conditions were appropriate for the operation.
At this point the intelligence analysts produced finished target packets for
distribution and the special operations teams briefed the task force commander
for final approval.
Knowledge
Management
Collecting
the necessary information was only half the job. Our intelligence staff
leadership ensured its timely dissemination by creating a file architecture
that allowed individual teams and leaders to review collection as it happened.
The critical part of this method was that we gave every special operations team
access to our intelligence network so they could review the progress of
collection on a target before it was a finished product. Some might argue that
this could lead teams to conduct their own analysis and bypass us. However, in
practice, we found this was not the case.
In
some instances, teams were able to see that there was a lack of useful
intelligence for a target and asked us to cease collection rather than wasting
a host of assets on a target that would clearly never be actioned. In other
cases, teams saw pieces of intelligence that drastically changed how they
viewed an objective and modified their plans accordingly. By giving the special
operations teams complete access to our files, they were able to constantly adjust
their plans, rather than waiting until they received a fully formed target
package.
Another
essential part of knowledge management was making sure that we were plugged
into the larger intelligence architecture. As outlined in the previous section,
we queried our teams for their perspective on potential targets, but we also
reached out to other agencies and organizations. We made frequent visits to the
collocated division headquarters and shared our plans and intelligence with
their staff. Being a division headquarters they were able to support us with
staff sections that we did not have the manpower to fill at our headquarters.
We also reached out to the various partner nations fighting alongside us.
Though it was sometimes difficult to find the right point of contact, national
intelligence agencies provided us with some very powerful tools and insightful
products throughout our deployment. This helped us ensure that we had provided
our teams with every possible piece of information and thus an advantage over
the enemy.
Real
Time Support
In
order to better support the maneuver elements on mission, we developed a
standard operating procedure for all source intelligence support to troops in
contact with the enemy. Immediately upon notification that one of our teams was
in a TIC, our area analysts reviewed the concept of the operation and briefed
the intelligence staff on the area of operations. Our analysts told us if the
attack fit the pattern of previous attacks and if so which network was the most
likely culprit for the attack. If the attack was anomalous, we tried to figure
out which networks in the area had experience and resources necessary for the
attack. Once we formulated a professional opinion for which network was
responsible, we reviewed their overall capabilities and tried to determine if
the attack was likely to escalate, maintain its intensity, or taper off. Human
intelligence and counterintelligence personnel checked their databases for
potential sources in the area of the TIC and determined whether or not those
sources could give us real-time intelligence. Signals intelligence personnel
monitored the latest intelligence they received for anything relevant that we
could pass along to the team. They also aggressively employed any tools at
their disposal to gain further insight into the situation. Geospatial
intelligence personnel would review sightlines, high-speed avenues of approach,
and prominent terrain features that could provide our special operations teams
an advantage over the enemy.
We
then filtered out extraneous information and passed the most critical
information along to the current operations staff. The current operations staff
relayed that information to the team when possible. We found it was important
for intelligence personnel to relay information through the current operations
staff. By doing that, we avoided overwhelming the troops in contact with
information while they were busy with the current fight. While most of our
analysts were busy providing threat information to the current operations
staff, other members of the intelligence staff coordinated with our Judge
Advocate. Rather than keeping him out of discussions, we included our JAG from
the beginning of the process to make sure he understood specific threat
behaviors. This allowed him to explain to higher echelon commands why our teams
took certain actions in self defense.
Conclusion
Our
primary obligation as intelligence professionals is to support commanders with
timely, relevant intelligence. When the maneuver commander can watch a target
packet being built over the course of the operational cycle, he knows that the
intelligence driving his mission is valid. Due to 16 years of conflict, most
maneuver commanders these days have enough experience with intelligence to
properly use and protect it. Because our enemies in COIN and Gray Zone
conflicts tend to operate in flat organizations, we must look for every
possible way to increase the speed of our decision cycle. Continuous
dissemination is the right way for intelligence professionals to do their part.
Regards
Pralhad
Jadhav
Senior Manager @
Knowledge Repository
Khaitan
& Co
Upcoming Lecture | ACTREC - BOSLA Annual lecture series (125th birth anniversary of father of library
science, Padmashree Dr. S. R. Ranganathan) on Saturday, 12th August 2017 at Advanced Centre for Treatment,
Research and Education in Cancer (ACTREC), Kharghar, Navi Mumbai. (Theme | 'MakerSpace')
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